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Abstract
Essentially all Internet communication relies on the Domain
Name System (DNS), which rst maps a human-readable
Internet destination or service to an IP address before two
endpoints establish a connection to exchange data. Today,
most DNS queries and responses are transmitted in clear-
text, making them vulnerable to eavesdroppers and trac
analysis. Past work has demonstrated that DNS queries can
reveal everything from browsing activity to user activity in
a smart home. To mitigate some of these privacy risks, two
new protocols have been proposed: DNS-over-HTTPS (DoH)
and DNS-over-TLS (DoT). Rather than sending queries and
responses as cleartext, these protocols establish encrypted
tunnels between clients and resolvers. This fundamental ar-
chitectural change has implications for the performance of
DNS, as well as for content delivery.
In this paper, we measure the eect of DoH and DoT on
name resolution performance and content delivery. We nd
that although DoH and DoT response times can be higher
than for conventional DNS (Do53), DoT can perform better
than both protocols in terms of page load times, and DoH can
at best perform indistinguishably from Do53. However, when
network conditions degrade, webpages load quickest with
Do53, with a median of almost 0.5 seconds faster compared
to DoH. Furthermore, in a substantial amount of cases, a web-
page may not load at all with DoH, while it loads successfully
with DoT and Do53. Our in-depth analysis reveals various
opportunities to readily improve DNS performance, for ex-
ample through opportunistic partial responses and wire format
caching.
1 Introduction
TheDomainNameSystem(DNS)underpinsnearlyall Internet
communication; DNS lookups map human-readable domain
names to corresponding IP addresses of Internet endpoints.
Because nearly every Internet communication is preceded by
a DNS lookup, and because some applications may require
tens to hundreds of DNS lookups for a single transaction,
such as a web browser loading a page, the performance of
DNS is paramount. Many historical DNS design decisions
and implementations (e.g., caching, running DNS over UDP
instead of TCP) have thus focused on minimizing the latency
of each DNS lookup.
In the past several years, however, DNS privacy has become
a signicant concern and design consideration. Past research
has shown that DNS lookups can reveal various aspects of
user activity including the web sites that a user is visiting,
and even the devices that a user may have in their home (and
how they are using them). As a result, various eorts have
been developed to send DNS queries over encrypted transport
protocols. Two prominent examples are DNS-over-TLS (DoT)
and DNS-over-HTTPS (DoH). In both cases, a client sends
DNS queries to the resolver over an encrypted transport (TLS),
which relies on the Transmission Control Protocol (TCP).
The use of encrypted transports makes it impossible for pas-
sive eavesdroppers to observe DNS queries, like an attacker
for devices on a shared network (e.g., a wireless network in
a coee shop). These transports also allow clients to send
encrypted DNS queries to a third-party resolver (e.g., Google
or Cloudare), preventing a user’s ISP from seeing the DNS
queries of its subscribers. As such, from a privacy perspective,
DoT and DoH are attractive protocols, providing condential-
ity guarantees that DNS previously lacked.
On the other hand, encrypted transports introduce new
performance costs, including the overhead associated with
TCP and TLS connection establishment, as well as additional
application-layer overhead. The extent of these performance
costs is not well-understood. An early preliminary study by
Mozilla found that DoH lookups are only marginally slower
than conventional, unencrypted DNS over port 53 (Do53) [23].
However, Mozilla only measured resolution timings, which
does not accurately reect the holistic end-user experience.
In this paper, we measure how encrypted transports for
DNS aect end-user experience in web browsers. We nd that
DNS queries are typically slower with encrypted transports.
Much to our surprise, however, we discovered that using
DoT can result in faster page load times compared to using
Do53 and DoH. When exploring the underlying reasons for
this behavior, we discovered that encrypted transports have
previously ignored quirks that signicantly aect application
performance. For example, when DNS requests are sent over
a lossy network, DoH and DoT are able to recover faster than
Do53 because TCP packets can be retransmitted within 2x
the round-trip-time latency to a recursive resolver.
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Onnetworkswithsub-optimalperformancehowever, these
protocols begin to suer because of their connection and trans-
port overhead. The relative costs and benets of a particular
DNS transport protocol and its corresponding implementa-
tion for DNS lookup performance and web page load time
ultimately depend on the underlying network conditions.
This variability suggests that in some cases, clients (i.e., op-
erating systems or browsers) might consider using dierent
transport protocols for DNS based on their varying cost, per-
formance, and privacy trade-os. Our ndings also suggest
uncontroversial and easy improvements to the conventional
stub resolver and browser DNS implementations.
In this paper, we make the following contributions:
• We provide the rst extensive performance study of Do53,
DoT, and DoH. We measure DNS lookup and page load
times across Do53, DoT, and DoH. We evaluate these
DNS transports and implementations of them using pop-
ular open recursive resolvers operated by Cloudare,
Quad9, and Google, as well as a conventional DNS re-
solver operated by a university network.
• We show that encrypted DNS transports can lead to im-
proved user experience compared to unencrypted DNS. We
nd that DNS lookup times for DoH and DoT are gen-
erally slower than Do53. However, page load times can
be faster when using DoT, and DoH can perform at best
indistinguishably from Do53. We oer several possi-
ble explanations, such as dierences in UDP application
timeouts and TCP retransmission times.
• We give generally applicable insights to optimize DNS
performance. We identify underlying reasons for why
DoT can outperform Do53 in page load times. Based on
these insights, we then propose several optimizations to
improve DNS lookup times, such as wire-format caching
and support for partial responses.
2 Background
At a high level, the process for resolving domain names into IP
addresses works in several steps. A client queries a recursive
resolver (“recursor”), for example, “what is the IP address
for www.example.com?” The client has traditionally been a
stub resolver, which is a lightweight process that manages
DNS interactions with the global DNS infrastructure. If the
recursor does not have an answer for the domain name cached,
it will issue the query on the client’s behalf to upstream servers
in the DNS hierarchy, including the root, TLD, and ultimately
authoritative servers for a given domain. Once the answer
is returned to the recursor, the recursor caches the response
and sends it to the client.
Due to the historical origins of the DNS, there are several
privacy problems that were not originally considered [3].
For example, DNS queries sent over port 53 (or “Do53”) are
typically unencrypted. This means that any eavesdropper
listening to trac between the client and a recursor can see
what queries the client is making. Such information can be
used to reveal personal information, such as browsing pat-
terns and client device types, which can then be used to link
user identity with user trac. While recursors themselves
could also observe every query a client makes, recent proto-
cols have been introduced to (at least) improve privacy for
DNS trac in transit between clients and DNS servers.
Hu et al. proposed DNS-over-TLS (or “DoT”) in 2016 to
prevent eavesdroppers from observing DNS trac between
a client and a recursor [16]. It works largely similar to Do53,
but the DNS trac is sent over an established TLS connection,
which means that it relies on TCP by default rather than
on UDP. Once the connection is established, all queries are
encrypted by the transport sent over port 853. Although DoT
is relativelynew, ithas seenasignicant increase inpopularity
since its introduction as some operating systems, such as
Android, have started to use DoT opportunistically [21].
In 2018, Homan et al. proposed DNS-over-HTTPS to pre-
vent on-path manipulation of DNS responses [15]. DoH is
similar to DoT, but uses HTTP as the transport protocol in-
stead of TCP. Wire format DNS queries and responses are sent
using HTTP, and client applications and servers are respon-
sible for translating between the application-layer messages
and traditional DNS infrastructure. An argument for DoH
versus DoT has surrounded anti-censorship concerns, as DoH
uses port 443 compared with port 853. Oppressive regimes
sometimes censor the Internet by dropping DNS trac, but
DoH requires a malicious network operator to drop all HTTPS
trac (on port 443) to prevent name resolution.
In this paper, we do not investigate the privacy and anti-
censorship properties oered by each protocol. Rather, we
are focus on the eects that Do53, DoT, and DoH have on
web performance and analyzing their respective costs and
benets. We believe such measurements are necessary for
users to make informed decisions about protocol choice for
this crucial function of the Internet.
3 Method
In this section, we rst dene the performance metrics that
we study (DNS resolution time and web page load time), and
explain how we measure them. Second, we describe our
experiment setup.
3.1 Metrics
To understand how Do53, DoT, and DoH aect browser
performance on the modern web, we measure page load time
andDNSresolution time. DNSresolution timingsaregathered
using a custom client.
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3.1.1 DNS Resolution Time
To obtain precise, accurate DNS lookup timings, we use the
getdns and libcurl C libraries to measure Do53, DoT, and DoH
performance.1
Getdns is a library that provides a modern API for making
Do53 andDoT queries in variousprogramming languages [14].
We use the C bindings to make Do53 and DoT queries for each
unique domain in the HARs that we collect. To simulate
Firefox page loads, we ensure that DoT queries use the same
TLS connection for up to 10 seconds. We also ensure that all
Do53 queries are made over UDP.
Libcurl is a library that allows developers to use cURL fea-
tures in their applications [35]. It supports POST requests
over HTTPS, which can be used to make DoH queries after
adding the “application/dns-message” MIME type. As of April
2019, libcurl supports HTTP/2, which we use because HTTP/2
being the recommended minimum HTTP version for DoH
due to HTTP/2 multiplexing [15].
3.1.2 Page Load Time
We use Mozilla Firefox controlled by Selenium to visit a list
of websites in our dataset and record timings. We measure
page load times are gathered by inspecting HTTP Archive
objects (HARs), which can be collected from any webpage
in Firefox [39]. We collect HARs for each website, which
include timings for the onLoad event, as well as for individual
components for each request that the browser made, including
all resources of a page.
Although HARs also provide DNS lookup timings, we dis-
covered during the course of our experiments that the timings
for individual components, including DNS lookup times, are
inaccurate. For example, we discovered that the rst request
that a HAR contains can show DNS timings of 0 ms, even in
cases where it is impossible because we begin every browsing
session with an empty cache and the latency to the recursor is
larger than 10 ms. This is the case because, depending on how
a website issues HTTP redirects, the rst request occurring
in the HAR is not actually the rst request that the browser
performed. Instead, the browser might have performed a va-
riety of other HTTP requests and DNS queries before, which
may still be in-progress or already cached.
Interestingly, this peculiarity not only results in timings
of 0 ms, but other values as well. Other values are possible
because the browser may issue multiple requests to the same
domain at dierent times through its thread pool, with the
rst one being redirected (thus, itself not being in the HAR,
and the redirection target having a timing of 0 ms), and other
requests made in between resolving the name of the domain
for the domain’s rst request.
In turn, the subsequent requests’ domain lookups can be
answered from the cache that the domain’s rst request popu-
lated. However, the request itself does not appear in the HAR.
Depending on when the requests are made, which depends on
1The tool will be publicly released at the time of publication.
factors such as rendering time, the timings can take any value
and shift the timings to the left. This would even be the case
if we would use the maximum of all values, because the rst
request that triggers resolving the domain may not be present
in the HAR. Therefore, we only rely on the onLoad event
timings for page loads from the HAR; onLoad event timings
should be more accurate because onLoad is an event widely
used by JavaScript code running on millions of webpages. It
is also implemented by all major browser vendors.
3.2 Experiment Setup
To ensure that our results are generalizable and are repre-
sentative of diverse network conditions and congurations,
we perform measurements across multiple resolvers, net-
works, and website lists. Doing so allows us not only to
measure browser experience for dierent users, but also to
understand how Do53, DoH, and DoT perform under dierent
network conditions. We describe our hardware conguration,
our choices of website lists, resolvers, and networks below.
3.2.1 Hardware
Our experiment setup includes three desktop-class PCs run-
ning Debian testing (buster). Each machine includes 32 GB
of RAM and an 8th generation Intel Core i7 CPU. The ma-
chines are connected to the diering provider networks over
Ethernet, and run a measurement suite designed to collect
browser-based statistics as well as raw DNS performance
statistics. We create a Docker image2 to deploy the measure-
ment suite across all of the machines.
3.2.2 DNS Recursors and Transport Protocols
We measure how selection of the recursive resolver and DNS
transport aect browser performance. Accordingly, we chose
three popular publicly-available recursive resolvers: Google,
Quad9, and Cloudare. Each resolvers oers public resolution
for Do53, DoT, and DoH.
Do53 and DoH are natively supported in Firefox, the
browser we use to drive our measurements. However, as of
April 2019, DoT must be congured by using a stub resolver
on a user’s machine outside of Firefox. For our measurements,
we use Stubby for DoT resolution, a stub resolver based on
the getdns library [10]. Stubby listens on a loopback address
and responds to for Do53 queries. All DNS requests received
by Stubby are then sent out to a congured recursive resolver
over DoT. We modify /etc/resolv.conf on our measurement
systems to point to the loopback address served by Stubby.
This forces all DNS requests initiated by Firefox to be sent
over DoT.
We also use a local university resolver to measure page
load times and DNS performance. However, this resolver
only supports Do53, and not DoT or DoH. Thus, this resolver
serves as a baseline for browser performance over DNS on a
university network.
2The Docker image will be publicly released at publication.
3
Connectivity Recursor MinimumLatency Average Latency MaximumLatency Standard Deviationσ Observations
Default 0.28ms 0.44ms 11.42ms 0.11ms 49,999
Quad9 2.20ms 3.00ms 55.29ms 0.34ms 149,993
Google 2.54ms 2.94ms 53.18ms 0.34ms 149,987
Wired University
Cloudare 2.36ms 2.85ms 166.06ms 0.62ms 149,964
Default 52.67ms 53.91ms 90.93ms 0.71ms 49,744
Quad9 54.68ms 56.46ms 291.57ms 1.26ms 149,240
Google 54.91ms 56.39ms 215.91ms 1.07ms 149,172
Cellular 4G
Cloudare 54.77ms 56.29ms 263.51ms 1.10ms 149,204
Default 52.67ms 53.93ms 92.11ms 0.68ms 49,244
Quad9 54.68ms 56.85ms 336.34ms 9.73ms 147,489
Google 54.95ms 56.57ms 333.59ms 6.48ms 147,659
Cellular 4G Lossy
Cloudare 54.72ms 56.55ms 335.53ms 8.55ms 147,565
Default 142.44ms 150.75ms 449.63ms 5.14ms 48,937
Quad9 144.54ms 153.64ms 622.37ms 10.80ms 146,466
Google 144.78ms 153.38ms 456.77ms 8.00ms 146,652
Cellular 3G
Cloudare 144.57ms 153.41ms 454.11ms 10.30ms 146,660
Table 1: Recursor latency characteristics for dierent network conditions.
3.2.3 Provider Networks
Our goal is to understand relationships between end-user (i.e.,
browser) performance, DNS, and network performance. DNS
performance is greatly eected by a client’s Internet service
provider, as the ISP’s network conguration determines the
paths the DNS trac will use to reach a resolver (should the
client opt to use a resolver that is hosted outside of the ISP
network). We are particularly interested in web performance
over networks that exhibit packet loss or high latency. We
believe it is important to simulate cellular performance as an
increasing number of users are browsing the web on their
phones. Furthermore, organizations like Cloudare have re-
leased mobile applications to force the operating system to use
encrypted DNS transports. We perform our measurements
using dierent ISP network scenarios, including conditions
that emulate mobile network characteristics.
First, we connect one machine to the Internet via a univer-
sity campus network. The university has a 20 Gb/s connection
to the Internet. It is a well-connected network to Cloudare,
Quad9, and Google, respectively (Table 1). We also gather
measurements using the default resolver that is managed by
the university and hosted locally. We chose this network to
measure the best-case eect of dierent DNS transports on
web performance.
Second, we place a measurement node on the university
network, butwith tracshapingapplied toemulate4Gmobile
network performance. We shape outgoing trac with an
additional latency of 53.3 ms and jitter set to 1 ms. We also
dropped 0.5% of packets to mimic the loss that cellular data
networks can exhibit. Finally, we shape our uplink rate to 7.44
Mb/s and our downlink rate to 22.1 Mb/s. These settings are
based on an OpenSignal report of mobile network experience
across providers [38].
Third, we apply trac shaping to emulate a 4G network
with additional loss (4G Lossy in Table 1). We use the same
latency and jitter settings as 4G, but we increase the loss rate
to 1.5% of packets.
Finally, we emulate 3G network performance by adding 150
ms or latency and 8 ms of jitter, along with 2.1% packet loss
and uplink and downlink rates of 1 Mb/s each. While users in
well-connected areas are increasingly less likely to experience
3G performance, it remains prevalent globally, particularly in
less developed areas. Table 1 shows the measured latencies to
dierent DNS providers from our varying network conditions.
To avoid biasing results due to network quiet and busy
times, as well as the potential eect of a query warming the
recursive cache for subsequent queries from the other proto-
cols tested, we randomize several aspects of the measurement
suite. First, for each run through the list of websites, we shuf-
e the order of websites prior to browsing. Next, for each
individual website, we randomize the order of DNS protocol
as well as the DNS provider.
3.2.4 Websites
We collect HARs (and resulting DNS lookups) for the top
1,000 websites on the Tranco top-list to understand browser
performance for the average user [22] visiting popular sites.
Furthermore, we measure the bottom 1,000 of the top 100,000
websites (ranked 99,000 to 100,000) to understand browser
performance for websites that are less popular. We chose
to measure the tail of the top 100,000 instead of the tail of
the top 1 million because we found through experimentation
that many of the websites in the tail of the top 1 million were
oine at the time of our measurements. Furthermore, there is
signicant churn in the tail of top 1 million, which means that
we would not be accurately measuring browser performance
for the tail across the duration of our experiment.
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3.3 Limitations
Our research has some limitations that may aect the gen-
eralization of our results. Nonetheless, we argue that our
work will further the research community’s understanding
of how DNS aects user experience, and how various DNS
stakeholders can improve it.
First, we performed our measurements exclusively on the
Debian operating system, which means that its networking
stack and parameters for networking algorithms will aect
our measurements. However, networking stacks are often
heavily optimized, so we expect our results to generalize
across operating systems.
Second, we rely on Mozilla Firefox to measure page load
times, which means that its DNS implementations will inu-
ence our results. Considering that web browsers are among
the most used software today and also highly optimized for
performance, we also expect our results to generalize across
browsers.
Finally, we conducted our experiments from a single net-
work at a major university on the east coast of the United
States. On one hand, this means that we are not able to gener-
alize our results across other networks. On the other hand,
this network is equally well-connected to all three external
recursors (Cloudare, Google, and Quad9), with an average
of 2.85ms to 3.0ms and a standard deviation between 0.34ms
and 0.62ms (Table 1). This allows us to contrast recursors
and protocols directly, without being negatively eected by
additional delay to certain recursors due to peering.
4 Measurement Results
In this section, we describe our measurement results for DNS
resolution times and page load times, and analyze the under-
lying protocols to understand the performance we see. Our
measurement was performed continuously over the course
of seven days using the setup described in Section 3. These
results provide some insight into how a user’s choice of net-
works, resolvers, and protocols aect end-user experience.
4.1 DNS Resolution Time
Intuitively, DNS resolution time is the most critical metric
when characterizing DNS performance, as web pages typi-
cally include many objects (e.g., images, javascript, frames,
etc.), which all must have their underlying server names re-
solved to IP addresses. Indeed, previous work has shown that
DNS lookups can cause performance bottlenecks on website
page loads [40]. Accordingly, we begin our study with the
resolution times for our network environments.
We note that Mozilla conducted a measurement study of
DoH lookup times in 2018 with Firefox Nightly users. In
their measurement study, they found that most requests were
6 ms slower than Do53 requests, and that DoH actually has
faster lookup times than Do53 for the slowest requests [23].
However, Mozilla’s experiment was limited to Cloudare’s
DoH resolver, and they report no data for other recursive
resolvers, like Quad9 and Google. Furthermore, they only
measure DoH, ignoring DoT entirely.
To ll these gaps and independently validate Mozilla’s re-
sults, we designed our own experiment to measure lookup
times for DoH, DoT, and Do53 across dierent networks and
resolvers. For each HAR le that we collected with our auto-
mated browser, we extracted all unique domain names. We
then time the resolution time for each domain name through
our own tool, which uses getdns and libcurl.
For DoT requests, we enabled connection reuse with an
idle timeout of 10 seconds in order to amortize the TCP hand-
shake and TLS connection setup. Although Firefox does not
currently support DoT within the browser, we believe this is
a realistic setting, and is the default timeout used by DoT stub
resolvers such as Stubby. For DoH requests, we also enabled
connection reuse, and we sent requests over HTTP/2, which
is the recommended minimum HTTP version for DoH and
which Firefox uses for DoH (we independently veried that
Firefox uses HTTP/2 through a packet capture with mitm-
proxy and Wireshark [5, 7]).
Figure 1 shows CDFs for DNS resolution times on the uni-
versity network for the top 1,000 websites and the top 99k-
100k websites combined. As expected, we nd that Do53 per-
forms better than DoT and DoH on for most lookups across all
resolvers. The additional overhead introduced by encrypted
transports for DoT and DoH leads to an increase in resolution
time. Interestingly, however, we nd that DoH is slightly
faster than Do53 for the slowest queries on Cloudare and
Quad9. We believe this can be attributed to HTTP caching,
which we discuss in further detail in Section 5.2.2.
Comparing DoT with DoH, we see some dierences be-
tween providers. Cloudare DoT and DoH appear to perform
equally for the majority of requests, though DoH begins to
outperform DoT for requests that take longer than ≈50ms.
Google, on the other hand, shows that DoT generally outper-
forms DoH for requests that take less than ≈100ms, above
which DoH performs better. We posit that this could be due
to the experimental nature of Google’s DoH service, as it
may have a dierent caching backend than the DoT or Do53
Google recursors. Quad9 shows the largest range in terms of
performance, with DoT requests experiencing long latencies
compared to all other recursors and protocols. Quad9’s DoH
recursor tends to perform better in comparison, but still lags
behind their Do53 service.
4.2 Page Load Time
Based on our resolution results, we expect page load times
to follow a similar pattern, with Do53 outperforming both
DoT and DoH. Figure 2 shows CDFs for dierences in page
load times between each conguration when running our
measurements on the university network. The vertical line
on each subplot indicates the median for the CDF. A median
that is less than 0s on the x-axis means that the conguration
(recursor, protocol) specied by the row title is faster than the
conguration specied by the column title (indicated in blue
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Figure 1: Resolution times for each provider on a university network.
hues). Correspondingly, a median that is greater than 0s on
the x-axis means that the conguration specied by the row
title is slower than the conguration specied by the column
title (indicated in red hues). Finally, a median that is close to
0s (between -0.03s and 0.03s) indicates that row conguration
and column conguration perform indistinguishably from
each other (0.03s correspond to 1 frame at 30Hz).
Interestingly, Cloudare DoT outperforms all other non-
Cloudare congurations, including the default Do53 recur-
sor. Similarly, Cloudare Do53 and DoH outperform most
non-Cloudare congurations. Lastly, Cloudare DoH, DoT,
and Do53 perform indistinguishably from each other. These
results stand in contrast to our naïve expectation that page
load times for DoT and DoH would be slower than Do53 due
to additional latency for individual requests, as our results in
Section 4.1 show that DoT and DoH requests are on average
slower than Do53 requests.
We believe the reason why Cloudare DoT, DoH, and Do53
perform so similarly on a university network in page load
times is because the additional latency introduced by DoT
and DoH is minimal compared to the overall page load time.
As Figure 1a shows, 70% of DoH and DoT queries complete
in less than ≈50ms. On the other hand, 70% of Do53 queries
complete in less than≈10ms. However, the dierence in page
load times between these protocols is indistinguishable on a
well-connected network.
Importantly, the client implementations of Do53, DoT,
and DoH dier substantially. As we discuss in Section 4.5,
DoH has a higher overhead per query than Do53 and DoT.
However, for Do53 and DoT, Firefox resolves names syn-
chronously with a thread pool (via the operating system
through getaddrinfo()) [25]. On the other hand, the DoH
implementation is asynchronous using Firefox’s optimized
HTTP/2 implementation [26, 28]. This may mean that DoH
may be able to make up for its larger overhead than Do53 and
DoT because page loads won’t be blocked by synchronous
queries if the thread pool is exhausted.
We note that pages that were loaded with DoT and DoH
were slightly slower with Quad9. Similarly, pages that were
loaded with DoH were signicantly slower with Google.
There are multiple reasons why this might be the case, such
as caching performance and recursor implementations. We
discuss these reasons in depth in Section 4.4.
4.3 Eect of Network Conditions
We also study how network conditions aect lookup times
and page load times for Do53, DoT, and DoH. Our results in
Section 4.1 and Section 4.2 are based on measurements con-
ducted from a well-connected university network. However,
cellular network users and users in developing regions often
access the Internet through networks with high latency and
signicant loss. We expect such less-than-ideal conditions of
these networks may signicantly aect how Do53, DoT, and
DoH perform.
Figure 3a and Figure 3b show CDFs for resolution times
with Cloudare’s recursor on an emulated cellular 4G network
and an emulated lossy cellular 4G network. We focus on
Cloudare’s recursor because it performs better than Quad9
and Google (Figure 1 and Figure 2). On cellular networks,
Do53 signicantly outperforms DoT and DoH in terms of
resolution time. Interestingly, it appears that DNS timings
on a cellular 4G and lossy cellular 4G network are similar,
independent of the additional 1% loss.
Figure 3c shows CDFs for resolution times for cellular 3G
network characteristics, which have higher loss, higher la-
tency, and less bandwidth than 4G networks, and, in turn, we
expect it aects DNS performance dramatically. We nd that
DoT and DoH resolution times are substantially longer than
Do53 resolution times. The fastest DoH and DoT lookups
take ≈470ms, whereas the fastest Do53 lookups take ≈150ms.
In fact, even the slowest DoH and DoT lookups never close
the latency gap to the slowest Do53 lookups. Based on this
signicant dierence, we expect page load performance on
3G to be better with Do53 than with DoT or DoH.
To test our hypothesis, we also measure page load times on
the emulated networks. Figure 4 compares page load times
across all of our tested networks and protocols for Cloudare’s
recursors. On the cellular 4G network, DoT performs indis-
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Figure 2: CDFs for dierences in page load times between each conguration.
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Figure 3: DNS timings for Cloudare across each protocol on three emulated lossy networks
tinguishably from Do53. However, DoT performs slightly
better than Do53 on the lossy 4G network, with page load
times that are slightly faster (between 100ms and 1s faster).
Interestingly, DoH performs indistinguishably from Do53 on
the lossy 4G network, but it performs worse on the standard
4G network.
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Figure 4: Comparison of page load times between protocols and networks using Cloudare’s resolver
It may seem counter-intuitive that page loads using DoT
and DoH perform indistinguishably or better than Do53 on the
4G and lossy 4G networks due to substantially longer lookups
(Figure 3). However, the dierences in how DNS timeouts are
handled between TCP and UDP oer a possible explanation.
For example, the default timeout for Do53 requests in Linux
is set to 5 seconds by resolvconf [20]. For DoT and DoH on
the other hand, DNS packets may be retransmitted within 2x
the round-trip-time latency to a recursive resolver because of
TCP. If the round-trip time to a recursive resolver is on the
order of hundreds of milliseconds, then DoT and DoH will
more quickly re-transmit dropped packets than Do53.
However, as throughput decreases and loss increases on
a 3G network, DoT and DoH are no longer able to perform
as well as Do53 concerning website page loads. We believe
this can be attributed to their higher overhead compared to
Do53, which contributes to link saturation for most websites.
Correspondingly, DoH’s has a higher overhead than DoT,
which leads to signicantly slower page loads (Figure 4d and
Figure 4h). Furthermore, if name resolutions fail entirely, then
objects on the web page cannot load, and the web page fails
to load completely.
Table 2 shows the prevalence and types of errors we en-
countered during our page load measurements. Overall, we
see that in lossier conditions, DoH experiences higher fail-
ure rates compared with Do53. For instance, using the 3G
settings, Cloudore Do53 has 4.84 percentage points (27.4%)
more successful page loads compared with Cloudare DoH.
We also see that DNS errors spike for DoH in poor network
conditions. Conversely, DoT tends to maintain higher rates
of success compared with DoH.
4.4 Recursor Behavior
Cloudare’s recursors result in consistently lower page
load times than any other recursor we measured, including
the default Do53 recursor provided by the university net-
work (Figure 2, H1 through J10). We believe that Cloudare’s
caching strategy is a core reason for their better performance.
Specically, their recursors can cache responses more easily
because they do not support the EDNS Client Subnet exten-
sion (ECS) [4, 6], which Google generally supports [12], and
Quad9 may support for some upstream authoritative name-
servers [31, 37].
The purpose of ECS is to forward the client’s address or
network to the authoritative server via the recursor, which
allows the authoritative server to provide a response to the
recursor that takes the client’s address into account, for ex-
ample to direct it to a server that is located nearby. By not
supporting ECS, Cloudare’s recursors can have higher cache
hit rates, in particular for a client’s rst requests. Specically,
Cloudare does not need to limit cached responses to the
client’s IP address or network indicated through ECS in the
original query, that is, their cache is client agnostic. On the
contrary, the caches for Google and partially Quad9 must be
client specic because of ECS.
WebsiteandCDNoperators should thereforeconsideraban-
doning DNS-based localization and stop relying on ECS, and
instead adopt anycast. Interestingly, the cost that recursor
cache misses incur because of ECS could actually negate the
benets of directing a user to a local server via ECS in a vari-
ety of cases, and even directing him to a single central data
center (without anycast) could lead to a better user experi-
ence than ECS. Overall, disabling ECS not only improves client
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privacy, but our results show that it can also decrease client page
load times, leading to an immediate improvement in a user’s
browsing experience.
We also observe that Google DoH performs signicantly
worse than all other DNS recursors or protocols on the univer-
sity network (Figure 2, G1 through G10). For example, when
using Google DoH is used instead of Cloudare DoT–the
fastest conguration we measured–the same website loads
2.02s slower in the median case (G9 and I7). This may be
the case because Google’s DoH recursor is still experimen-
tal and the deployment is not optimized for production use.
Google’s DoH production deployment may perform better,
but it only speaks a proprietary JSON format that is incom-
patible with Mozilla Firefox and other RFC8484-compliant
DoH clients [11].
Quad9 DoT performs worse in page load times than all re-
cursors besides Google DoH, and a website loads 0.26s faster
using Cloudare DoT over Quad9 DoT. Similarly, Cloudare
DoT is faster than Quad9 Do53, which is the quickest proto-
col for Quad9. This is the case even though our latency to
Quad9 is lower than to Cloudare and has smaller variance
(Table 1), indicating that recursor performance and charac-
teristics are more important for page load times than network
connectivity to the recursor. Considering DNS resolution times
(Figure 1), we believe that Quad9 DoT does not correctly cache
responses, which leads to stacked normal distributions for
the connection to the recursor and the recursor’s connections
to authoritative nameservers. Another possible explanation
for Quad9 DoT’s odd behavior is that the recursor is trying
to connect to authoritative nameservers via DoT, which fails
and then triggers a retry via Do53. We disclosed our ndings
to Quad9, but we did not receive an explanation.
4.5 Query Cost Amortization
We also investigate when the overhead cost of sending DoH
and DoT requests is amortized. At rst glance, it seems that
DoT and DoH requests are strictly more expensive than Do53
requests. The client must establish a TLS connection with the
recursor before it can send any DoT or DoH requests, which
requires hundreds of bytes to be sent on its own. Subsequent
requests would then be accompanied by an IP header, TCP
header, TLS header, and a DNS header. In the case of DoH, an
HTTP/2 header must also be sent. On the other hand, Do53
does not require a TLS connection, and requests just have an
IP header, a UDP header, and a DNS header.
Fortunately, much of the TLS connection setup overhead
for DoT and DoH can be amortized if requests are sent over
a single, or relatively few, TLS connection(s). Furthermore,
multiple DoT/DoH requests that quickly follow one another
can share a TCP packet (Nagle’s algorithm [29]), whereas
each Do53 request must be its own UDP packet. Therefore,
we want to approximate how many requests must be sent
before the setup costs of DoT and DoH can be amortized.
For simplicity, we assume that a fully qualied domain
name is 10 bytes long. We also assume that a Do53 query
Cloudare
Connectivity Status Do53 DoT DoH
Successful 76.39% 76.24% 75.13%
Page-load Timeout 9.71% 9.70% 9.47%
DNS Error 9.32% 9.27% 9.42%
Selenium Error 1.86% 1.86% 1.79%
Wired University
Other Error 4.58% 4.79% 5.98%
Successful 77.18% 77.58% 77.48%
Page-load Timeout 10.59% 10.33% 10.23%
DNS Error 9.30% 9.29% 9.51%
Selenium Error 1.74% 1.86% 1.84%
Cellular 4G
Other Error 2.93% 2.80% 2.78%
Successful 76.97% 77.92% 77.89%
Page-load Timeout 10.52% 10.23% 9.98%
DNS Error 9.29% 9.25% 9.50%
Selenium Error 1.71% 1.72% 1.69%
Cellular 4G Lossy
Other Error 3.22% 2.60% 2.63%
Successful 22.46% 22.42% 17.62%
Page-load Timeout 66.40% 66.51% 51.40%
DNS Error 9.25% 9.25% 29.48%
Selenium Error 1.59% 1.51% 1.22%
Cellular 3G
Other Error 1.89% 1.82% 1.50%
Table 2: Successful website page-loads and error percentages
for dierent network conditions when using Cloudare’s
recursor. Please see Appendix A.1 for success and error rates
for all providers.
consists of 56 bytes, i.e. the UDP header (8 bytes), the IP
header (20 bytes), the DNS header (18 bytes), and the domain
name (10 bytes). Similarly, a DoT query consists of 33 bytes,
i.e. the TLS header (5 bytes), the DNS header (18 bytes), and
the domain name (10 bytes). Lastly, a DoH query consists of
55 bytes because it contains the same headers and data as a
DoT query (33 bytes) and the minimal HTTP/2 headers (22
bytes). We do not include the TCP/IP headers (40 bytes) for
each DoH/DoT query because multiple requests will be made
in one TCP packet.
We also estimate the static overhead associated with es-
tablishing a DoH or DoT connection on the client-side. For
DoT, the static overhead to the recursive resolver is 506 bytes,
comprised of the bytes needed to complete a TCP handshake
(80 bytes), send the TLS CLIENT HELLO (260 bytes), and send
the TLS CLIENT DONE (166 bytes). Similarly, for DoH, the static
overhead is 872 bytes, comprised of the bytes needed to com-
plete a TCP handshake (80 bytes), send the TLS CLIENT HELLO
(260 bytes), send the TLS CLIENT DONE (166 bytes), and send
HTTP/2 settings (366 bytes).
Finally, the minimum size of the headers in a TCP packet
is 40 bytes, comprised of the IPv4 header (20 bytes) and the
TCP header (20 bytes), which means that there are at most
1460 bytes available in a TCP packet for DoT/DoH requests
sent over Ethernet (MTU = 1500). Based on our estimates, we
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Figure 5: Approximate cost in bytes of sending Do53, DoT,
and DoH requests
can dene the bytes that the client needs to send to resolve r
domain names:
BytesDo53 = 56 × r
BytesDoT = 40 × d rb 146033 c
e + (33 × r ) + 285
BytesDoH = 40 × d rb 146055 c
e + (55 × r ) + 872
Figure 5 shows the corresponding number of bytes sent
by the client over Do53, DoT, and DoH as more requests are
issued. The cost of DoT requests are amortized over a single
TLS connection if more than 24 requests are made. This is
because a new UDP packet must be created for each Do53
query, whereas multiple DoT requests are able to share a
single TCP packet. Interestingly, DoH requests can never be
amortized for dierent values of r . The costs of HTTP/2
headers and sending HTTP/2 settings prevent DoH from
being less costly than DoT and Do53.
In the HARs we collect on a university network, the top
1,000 websites contain resources from a mean 16.25 domains,
a median of 10 domains, and a maximum of 216 domains.
Using the equations we dened in Section 4.5, we estimate
that for 10 requests (r = 10), 876 bytes are sent with DoT, and
560 bytes are sent with Do53. Thus, for the median website in
the top 1,000 list, 316 more bytes over DoT than Do53. These
results suggest that although DoT requests are not typically
amortized over a single TLS connection in a web browser,
the additional overhead of DoT is not prohibitively costly.
On the other hand, if a single TLS connection to a recursor
was shared by a web browser with multiple processes on a
given system, then the cost of DoT queries would be quickly
amortized. Such behavior would provide a clear performance
advantage to DoT over Do53.
5 Discussion
Based on our results, we oer several insights to improve
Do53, DoT, and DoH resolution times, which can reduce page
load times and improve user experience. We rst discuss our
DoH-specic insights, followed by our transport-independent
insights.
5.1 DoH Improvements
Our results indicate that DoH is almost always worse than
DoT in all network conditions despite its implementation
being asynchronous. It is worse in the percentage of pages
that load successfully (Table 3), and in page load times (Fig-
ure 2). Notwithstanding, we recognize that DoH over HTTP/2
could improve resolution time and page load performance in
specic circumstances, and it may have a future among DNS
transports for (at least) two reasons: HTTP/2 server push and
compression.
5.1.1 HTTP/2 Server Push
HTTP/2 server push enables web servers to push content to
a client that the client has not yet requested [1], but which
it is expected to request. It is based on the assumption that
when a client requests a web page, it will also request the
embedded objects shortly after receiving the initial page. In-
stead of requiring manual inlining of the page’s resources,
the web server can respond with multiple HTTP objects and
preempt and prevent additional requests by the client. When
preparing the request for a resource, the client realizes the
domain name points to the same address and can use the
response it already received through server push, without
the request ever being sent to the server. The scope of when
server push is permissible, however, is limited for security
reasons: Pushing resources for a dierent domain that may
be hosted on the same server or CDN still requires looking
up the domain through DNS.
HTTP/2 server push for DoH aims to eliminate this domain
lookup by also including the DNS response. It has received
some basic attention in DoH’s RFC [15], but various oper-
ational questions remain unanswered and require further
exploration before it could be adopted. For example, it is un-
clear how web servers and DoH servers would collaborate,
which they would have to, to allow the web server to push a
DNS response that the client can verify as valid and also ac-
cept (as DoH and web server may be dierent, and, thus, their
scope for permissible pushes is dierent). Eectively, only
large content-delivery networks like Cloudare and Google
would be able deploy such systems, which has raised concerns
over centralized DoH or “DNS over Cloud” (DoC) among DNS
stakeholders [17]. Similarly, HTTP/2 server push would re-
quire the application to resolve DNS itself, at least partially,
which would transgress current norms, and has sparked a
heated debate on the IETF DoH mailing list [18].
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5.1.2 Compression
Another potential advantage is compression of HTTP re-
sponses and, in turn, DNS responses. It could provide a non-
negligible improvement to DNS response sizes, if they are suf-
ciently large and repetitive that the compression overhead
can be amortized. Intuitively, this may be true for additional
and authoritative sections of a DNS response, however, public
recursors often remove these sections from their responses
to prevent denial-of-service amplication, and, thus, DNS re-
sponses are relatively small. Taking into account that HTTP/2
response compression occurs per HTTP/2 frame, responses
must be compressed individually and compression cannot
exploit repetition across responses.
Therefore, HTTP compression does not benet the major-
ity of DNS responses today. TLS compression may appear to
be a solution, but it is not supported by TLS 1.3 anymore [32]
and best current practices recommend to disable TLS 1.2 com-
pression to prevent compression-related attacks [34]. For
queries with more than one question QDCOUNT > 1 (see also
Section 5.2.1), compression could reduce DoH’s overhead to
be less than DoT’s or Do53’s, but it is currently unclear if
HTTP/2 compression could improve on existing DNS com-
pression [24, Section 4.1.4].
More research is necessary to investigate the yet-
unexplored potential advantages of HTTP/2 as a transport
for DNS more closely, and measure their potential benet for
the DNS ecosystem. Today, however, DoH results in a worse
user experience than DoT for comparable and well-managed
recursors.
5.2 Overall DNS Improvements
Based on our measurements and observations, we believe
that two improvements can be readily made to improve perfor-
mance of Do53, DoT, and DoH: opportunistic partial responses
and wire format caching.
5.2.1 Opportunistic Partial Responses
We discovered that current DNS clients do not utilize part
of the DNS Internet Standard that could improve client per-
formance and user experience. Unfortunately, DNS servers
violate this part of the DNS Internet Standard [24] by not sup-
porting queries with more than one question (QDCOUNT > 1).
The three public recursors we studied either do not respond
(Quad9 and Cloudare), or incorrectly only respond to the
rst question (Google).
Without compatible recursors, clients cannot utilize this
part of the standard to send fewer larger queries, and, thus, less
bytes due to reduced overhead. We were unable to discover
any reason in RFCs and on the IETF dnsop and dnsext mailing
lists why servers may misbehave. We speculate that it could
be because the DNS Internet Standard sets the expectation
that QDCOUNT is “usually 1” [24].
Naïvely, it also appears that there is no good reason to
support more than one question because it would delay the
response to a large query until all authoritative answers have
been received, which may take multiple seconds and, in turn,
severely degrade user experience. Furthermore, it would ef-
fectively eliminate the benet of out of order responses that
single question queries enable. Out of order responses are cur-
rently implemented in Do53 through UDP, in DoT through re-
sponse reordering [9], and in DoH through HTTP/2’s stream
multiplexing [1].
We believe that opportunistic partial responses could be a so-
lution: A client indicates that it wants to use partial responses
on the rst single question query through a EDNS partial
response option, which the server conrms if it supports it.
Thereafter, the client can send multiple questions in the same
query when including the same EDNS partial response option,
and the server can respond with individual answers or multi-
ple answers in a single DNS response as authoritative answers
arrive. We are currently exploring authoring a corresponding
Internet-Draft.
5.2.2 Wire Format Caching
In our DNS timing measurements, we conrmed Mozilla’s
ndings that the mean DoH response time is higher than for
DoT or Do53, but that its variance is lower, which results
in a reduced response time in the distribution’s tail. This
appears to be the case because Firefox uses a hard-coded
DNS transaction ID of 0 [27], which allows DoH recursors,
including Cloudare, to leverage HTTP response caching of
the DNS response’s wire format more aggressively and at the
edge. Correspondingly, this side-steps the issue of having to
always construct the DNS response and reduces the response
time, even if it can be constructed from a local cache database.
The security eect of a xed transaction ID is limited for
DoH because it relies on TLS, which makes it dicult to inject
a spoofed response that could be used to poison the client’s
cache. For DoT, the same argument can be made and it is
similarly amenable to wire format caching. For Do53, a xed
transaction ID would allow cache poisoning, and, hence, it is
not a viable solution.
Generally, to improve tail response times, we suggest to
cache the DNS response wire format regardless of transaction
ID, and to simply replace the two byte transaction ID before
responding (e.g., via XOR), which also has the benet of being
compatible with DoT clients that send random transaction
IDs. It is important to note that the DNS TTL values of a
response also need to be updated (decremented) regularly,
and this invalidates the HTTP response or wire format cache,
but by decreasing the TTL by more than the required amount,
the wire format cache can be kept valid longer.
6 RelatedWork
In this section, we compare to related work on encrypted
DNS transport, measurements on how DNS impacts page
load times, and we touch on DNS privacy concerns.
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Zhu et al. [41] introduced DNS over TLS, that is DNS over
TLS over TCP, to provide condentiality guarantees that DNS
lacked. They measured the performance costs and benets of
sending DNS queries over a TLS connection, and nd that DoT
response times are only up 22% slower than Do53. We measure
higher DoT response times when measuring response times
naïvely due to fewer queries being sent and less connection
reuse. Dierent from Zhu et al., our study focuses on how
dierent DNS transports aect user experience, through page
load times, and how it diers in the face of dierent network
conditions. We nd that DoT improves web page load times
even if only few DNS queries are necessary because of faster
retransmits and Nagle’s algorithm.
To our knowledge, no comparable prior work exists for
DNS over HTTPS, and we believe that we provide the rst
in-depth study that investigates costs and benets for users
of Do53, DoT, and DoH for the modern web.
In addition to DoT and DoH, other protocols have been
proposed to ensure privacy of the communication between
a client and a recursive resolver. DNSCrypt [8] utilizes cryp-
tographic signatures to authenticate a recursive resolver to
a client, which prevents DNS responses from being spoofed
or tampered with. Similarly, DNSCurve [2] utilizes elliptic-
curve cryptography to provide condentiality, authenticity,
and integrity of DNS responses. However, for DNSCrypt
and DNSCurve, the recursive resolver remains aware of what
names a client queries for, which has privacy implications as it
allows the recursor to learn about the websites that the client
visits and when it visits them. Schmitt et al. [33] proposed
oblivious DNS, which prevents a resolver from associating
queries to the clients that sent them, and, thus, prevents a
recursor from learning a client’s browsing behavior.
Sundaresan et al. [36] measured and identied performance
bottlenecks for web page load time in broadband access net-
works and found that page load times are inuenced by slow
DNS response times and can be improved by prefetching. An
important distinction is that they dene the DNS response
time only as the lookup time for the rst domain, while we
consider the set of unique fully qualied domain names of
all resources contained in a page. They investigate only nine
high-prole websites, which stands in contrast to the 2,000
popular and normal websites that we analyze, and they es-
timate page load times through Mirage and validate their
ndings through a headless browser PhantomJS, while we
utilize Mozilla Firefox, which is a full browser.
Wang et al. [40] introduced WProf, which is a proling
system to analyze page load performance. They identied
that DNS lookups, in particular uncached, cold lookups can
signicantly aect web performance, accounting for up to
13% of the critical path delay for page loads.
In 2012, Otto et al. [30] found that CDN performance was
negatively aected when clients choose recursive resolvers
that were geographically separated from CDN caches. We
conjecture that this was the case because recursors did not
support ECS at the time (ECS was only introduced in January
2011, and standardized in May 2016) and CDNs only slowly
started adopting anycast. Therefore, clients were likely redi-
rected to sub-optimal data center based on the recursor’s
address or network, instead of the client’s address. We sus-
pect that with the wide-spread adoption of ECS and anycast
since 2012, CDN performance may not be considerably neg-
atively aected anymore when choosing a recursor that is
geographically far away from a CDN.
We note that there are also privacy concerns related to DNS
that are above the recursive resolver in the DNS hierarchy. For
example, Imana et al. [19] posit that clients could be tracked
above the recursor through personally identiable queries,
such as for “clintonemail.com.” Similarly, Hardaker [13] ana-
lyzed data sent by recursors in residential networks to root
servers over two months, and he discovered query names
that allow to identify specic smart home devices, such as
cameras. We focus on the costs and benets of DNS proto-
cols that mitigate privacy risks directly impacted by a user’s
choice of conguration. Because the user cannot inuence the
recursor’s protocol to the authoritative, we consider above
the recursive resolver as out of scope.
7 Conclusion
In this paper, we investigated DNS timings and page load
times using dierent DNS transport protocols in multiple
network conditions. We nd that although privacy-focused
DNS protocols result in higher resolution times for individual
queries, page load times improve due to inherent benets of
the underlying transport protocols.
Based on our ndings, DNS stakeholders can take several
concrete steps to improve DNS performance. For example,
browser currently use synchronous calls for DNS resolution,
and asynchronous calls could greatly benet Do53 and DoT
performance. We nd that client localization using anycast
is better than ECS, and, in fact, clients have an incentive
to not use ECS. Similarly, clients and recursors supporting
QDCOUNT > 1 along with partial responses could reduce the
question overhead for Do53, DoT, and Do53. This could be
accomplished in a backward compatible way through a new
EDNS option if the recursor will be extended to allow for
opportunistic partial responses. Another opportunity to im-
prove DoT and Do53 response times that we discovered is
wire format caching.
Our ndings also indicate that a user’s recursor choice can
have a signicant impact on the number of pages that load
successfully, and reduce the time they need to load. Therefore,
users should choose their DNS protocol based on network
conditions and their recursor based on intuitive metrics like
successful page loads and page load time, instead of pure DNS
response time, as the specic recursor choice can lead to direct
quality of life improvements.
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A Appendix
A.1 Error Table for All Providers
Please see Table 3.
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Default Quad9 Google Cloudare
Connectivity Status Do53 Do53 DoT DoH Do53 DoT DoH Do53 DoT DoH
Successful 76.11% 76.29% 75.53% 73.65% 76.08% 75.51% 74.63% 76.39% 76.24% 75.13%
Page-load Timeout 9.77% 9.61% 10.05% 9.18% 9.95% 9.83% 9.63% 9.71% 9.70% 9.47%
DNS Error 9.44% 9.46% 9.43% 10.57% 9.29% 9.28% 9.72% 9.32% 9.27% 9.42%
Selenium Error 1.84% 1.83% 1.89% 1.74% 1.86% 1.89% 1.86% 1.86% 1.86% 1.79%
Wired University
Other Error 4.68% 4.64% 4.99% 6.60% 4.68% 5.38% 6.02% 4.58% 4.79% 5.98%
Successful 76.59% 76.92% 76.32% 75.08% 76.91% 77.43% 76.55% 77.18% 77.58% 77.48%
Page-load Timeout 10.49% 10.53% 11.23% 10.14% 10.47% 10.55% 10.44% 10.59% 10.33% 10.23%
DNS Error 9.37% 9.46% 9.47% 11.63% 9.27% 9.28% 10.09% 9.30% 9.29% 9.51%
Selenium Error 1.86% 1.88% 1.85% 1.79% 1.80% 1.72% 1.82% 1.74% 1.86% 1.84%
Cellular 4G
Other Error 3.55% 3.09% 2.98% 3.15% 3.35% 2.74% 2.92% 2.93% 2.80% 2.78%
Successful 77.42% 77.10% 76.65% 75.18% 77.18% 77.59% 76.24% 76.97% 77.92% 77.89%
Page-load Timeout 10.42% 10.74% 11.19% 9.46% 10.65% 10.48% 10.40% 10.52% 10.23% 9.98%
DNS Error 9.36% 9.39% 9.42% 12.16% 9.23% 9.23% 10.47% 9.29% 9.25% 9.50%
Selenium Error 1.81% 1.60% 1.71% 1.89% 1.71% 1.76% 1.87% 1.71% 1.72% 1.69%
Cellular 4G Lossy
Other Error 2.80% 2.77% 2.74% 3.20% 2.94% 2.70% 2.89% 3.22% 2.60% 2.63%
Successful 22.65% 22.29% 22.13% 9.86% 22.45% 22.67% 13.66% 22.46% 22.42% 17.62%
Page-load Timeout 66.21% 66.50% 66.54% 29.02% 66.46% 66.02% 40.63% 66.40% 66.51% 51.40%
DNS Error 9.32% 9.39% 9.50% 60.11% 9.23% 9.32% 44.39% 9.25% 9.25% 29.48%
Selenium Error 1.48% 1.53% 1.56% 0.65% 1.55% 1.70% 0.95% 1.59% 1.51% 1.22%
Cellular 3G
Other Error 1.82% 1.82% 1.83% 1.01% 1.86% 1.99% 1.32% 1.89% 1.82% 1.50%
Table 3: Successful website page-loads and error percentages for dierent network conditions.
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